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Experiencing Time
Joel Smith on Husserl and the puzzling experience of time
Phenomenology, as I understand it, is primarily concerned with the concept of experience and,
correlatively, that of appearance (or, equivalently, phenomena). The primary phenomenological
questions, then, concern the nature of experience in all its varieties (perception, reﬂection,
imagination, emotion, and so on), and of things as they appear in experience. One might ask, for
example, what it is to visualize something; how visualizing differs from visually perceiving
something; and what the similarities and differences are between how things appear in those two
forms of experience. In its focus on experience, phenomenology differs from, for example,
metaphysics, which asks what things, including the objects of experience, are or epistemology,
which asks how these things can be known.
A fundamental feature of all experience is that it takes place in time. Indeed, the experience of
time generates philosophical puzzles. Augustine’s famous remark about the nature of time seems
just as appropriate when it comes to the consideration of the experience of time: ‘What, then, is
time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and
try to explain, I am bafﬂed’. The task of the phenomenologist, however, is to pose the question: in
what does the experience of time consist? In what follows, I want to give a sense of the puzzle but
without, I hope, the bafﬂement.
The clock on my ofﬁce wall has hour, minute, and second hands. I can see that the second hand is
moving. If I look for long enough, I will also see that the minute hand has moved. Longer still and I
will see that the hour hand has moved too. But, so it seems, I know these things in different ways.
Not only can I see that the second hand has moved, I can see its movement. The movement of the
second hand is something that I experience. This is not so with the hour hand. Although I can see
that it has moved, over a brief enough period of time my visual experience would not noticeably
differ if it were stationary. I come to know that the second hand is moving because I can see it
moving, but I come to know that the hour hand is moving by noting that its position has altered
over the period of time that I have been looking at it.
In experiencing the second hand’s movement, I experience an event, something that happens.
Events take time, thus in experiencing an event, I experience something as spread out over an
interval of time. And such experience, it would seem, is perceptual. The movement of the second
hand is something that I perceive. The movement of the hour hand, by contrast, is something that I
infer from what I see. But, quite plausibly, perceptual experience is and seems to be concurrent
with that which is perceived. In other words, when I perceptually experience something, it seems to
be happening now. In this way, perception is unlike memory—when I recall something, it seems to
have already happened. This creates a puzzle. We seem to be perceptually aware of something
both as spread out over time and also as happening now. But if, at any given time, we are aware
only of what is happening now, how can it be that we are aware, at any one time, of an event—
something that, essentially, happens over a duration? We need an account, then, of what it is to be
aware of an event as an event. We need an account of the experience of the passage of time.
William James denies that the things that we experience are all concurrent with the experience
itself. We are, that is, experientially aware of a span of time that includes both the present and also
the immediate past (and perhaps the future). So, at any one moment, we are perceptually aware
of a duration, something that extends beyond that moment. This span of time is the ‘specious
present’, and it is this that accounts for our sense of the passage of time and, thereby, our
experience of events.
Edmund Husserl‘s account of time-consciousness is, in a number of respects, similar to James’s.
Unlike James, however, Husserl has at his disposal an intentional account of perceptual
experience. That is, he possesses an account of how it is that perceptual experience is directedtowards (or about) things and thus, as many contemporary philosophers would put it, represents
things as being some way or another. Like James, Husserl claims that in the experience of an
event, one has at any one moment not only an experience of the phase occurring at that moment,
but also the phases that have just occurred and the phases that are soon to occur. His labels for
these three aspects of experience are, respectively, ‘primal impression’, ‘retention’, and
‘protention’. All three must be in place for one’s experience to present something as an event. The
primal impression is an awareness of the present phase of an event as now happening; the
retention (or, ‘primary memory’) is an awareness of a past phase of the event as having justhappened; and the protention is an awareness of the future phase of an experienced event asabout to happen.
On both James’s and Husserl’s accounts, at each moment I am perceptually aware of more than
what is occurring at that moment. That is, what is happening now seems to be surrounded a
‘temporal horizon’ of what happened then and what will happen. But this, it would seem, involves
denying the truism, mentioned above, that perceptual experience is and seems to be concurrent
with that which is perceived. Drawing on Ian Phillips‘ presentation of this worry, we might put it by
saying that the perceptual experience of a duration of time ought itself to seem to possess a
duration. Experience and the events experienced must march in step. But, on Husserl’s account,
the perceptual experience of duration, of an extended interval of time, is seemingly available at amoment. And surely, we might think, it is implausible to suppose that we experience a duration at
an instant. For surely, the experience of a duration must itself take time.
Can the Husserlian account be defended against this objection? Maybe. We can concede that it is
implausible—perhaps both phenomenologically and metaphysically—to suppose that I can
instantaneously experience an event with duration. The experience of an extended period of time,
we might think, must take a period of time to occur. But it is not at all obvious that this implausible
claim is a consequence of the view under consideration. It can be argued that on Husserl’s picture,
the experience of an event must indeed take the same period of time as does the event itself,
since each phase of the event must be experienced as now (via a primal impression). Thus, we
can accept that the perceptual experience of a duration of time ought itself to seem to possess a
duration. But doesn’t the Husserlian account allow that, at an instant, I experience more than what
is taking place at that instant? Yes, but not as happening now! One way of describing the content
of one’s perceptual experience of the sequence abc, at the time of b, would be, ‘a (which was
preceded by a, and will be succeeded by c)’. The retentional and protentional elements here
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provide the context, or temporal horizon, of the phase of the event that is taking place at the time
of the primal impression. This doesn’t mean that I can instantaneously experience an event with
duration, any more than the analogous claim that each point in visual space seems to be
surrounded by further points means that I experience an extended space at a point.
Perhaps, then, Husserl’s picture can be defended from the accusation that it is both metaphysically
and phenomenologically implausible. Whatever the case, it is certainly right to say that the
experience of time is something that if nobody asks us about it, we understand but when we face it
head on, is liable to cause a good deal of bafﬂement.
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